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M
oravian-born, Vienna-educated Professor Joseph
Alois Schumpeter, who liked to say of his 
aspirations to be the world’s greatest economist,
horseman, and lover that only the second had given 
him problems, was a study in contrasts. He relished his fame 
as one of the interwar years’ premier economic theorists, yet
modestly declined to mention his work in his Harvard 
classes or in his exhaustive book on the history of 
economic thought. (Citations to his work were inserted into
that book by his wife after his death.) An obsessively hard-
working, morose (indeed often depressed) writer in private,
he affected a public image of carefree, cheerful ebullience. A
notoriously easy grader to his students, he often gave himself
low marks in his diary. Aone-time banker, he relied upon the
women in his life to balance his checkbook. He chronicled
the evolution of the auto industry but never learned to drive.
He admired mathematics but failed to employ them in his
work. A harsh critic of the static, steady-state equilibrium
thinking of the neoclassical marginal utility/marginal produc-
tivity school, he nevertheless declared one of its founders, the
French neoclassical equilibrium theorist Leon Walras, the
greatest economist of all time. 
All of his life Schumpeter champi-
oned capitalism yet was an expert on
Marx, Marxist economics, and the
entire socialist literature. A Marxist
economist, Paul Sweezy, was among his
closest Harvard friends. He was a polit-
ical conservative and antisocialist who
notwithstanding served as Finance
Minister for a socialist government in
post-World War I Austria. He lauded
capitalism’s superior performance
while predicting the system’s death
from too much success. He preached
creative destruction — the incessant 
tearing down of old ways of doing
things by the new — as capitalism’s
inescapable iron law, yet he was unpre-
pared when his own work fell prey to it.
The 1990s saw the publication of at
least three biographies of this complex,
paradoxical figure. Now comes Thomas McCraw’s definitive
and elegantly written study to top them all. Drawing upon
Schumpeter’s diary, correspondence, early drafts, and 
published works, McCraw, a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
emeritus professor of Business History at Harvard, paints a
vivid picture of Schumpeter’s life and times, his loves and
achievements. Readers will choose their favorite parts of the
book. Most enlightening to this reviewer is McCraw’s survey
of Schumpeter’s scholarly contributions. Ironically, McCraw
writes that he is “not concerned with Schumpeter’s 
economic thinking, narrowly construed,” but with his “life
and his compulsive drive to understand capitalism.” But that
is a false dichotomy because Schumpeter’s theories cannot
be divorced from his attempts to come to grips with 
capitalism: Each guided and shaped the other. In any case,
McCraw provides a perceptive and accurate account of
Schumpeter’s academic greatest hits and misses. 
Greatest Hits
Hits include first and foremost the path-breaking 
and seminal The Theory of Economic Development, published 
in 1911 when Schumpeter, then 28, was in what he 
called his scholar’s “sacred third decade” of peak creativity.
Other hits followed including the subtle and provocative
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and the mighty
History of Economic Analysis, which Schumpeter worked on
throughout the whole decade of the 1940s, and which was
edited and published by his third wife, Elizabeth, four years
after his death in 1950.
Schumpeter pushed one idea all his
life: that capitalism means growth and
growth requires innovation. The book
that put him on the map, 
The Theory of Economic Development,
states for the first time his vision of
capitalism as the economic system
that delivers faster growth and higher
living standards (especially of the 
middle- and lower-income classes)
than any other system, albeit in a 
disruptive, jerky fashion. Like a 
perpetual motion machine, capitalism
generates its own momentum inter-
nally without the need of outside
force. Even technological change, 
seen by some as an exogenous propel-
lant, is treated by Schumpeter as 
a purely endogenous matter, the 
product of economically motivated
human ingenuity. Breaking from received wisdom, Schumpeter replaces
the static equilibrium analysis of his neoclassical 
marginalist predecessors and contemporaries with a 
dynamic disequilibrium theory of cyclical growth. 
His key building blocks are profits, entrepreneurs, 
bank credit creation, and innovation. Profits (supplemented
perhaps with a desire to create a business dynasty) motivate
entrepreneurs, who, financed by
bank credit, innovate new goods,
new technologies, and new methods
of management and organization.
These innovations fuel growth and
generate cycles. 
Why cycles? They arise when 
the first successful entrepreneur
overcomes the stubborn resistance
of incumbent interests and eases 
the path for other entrepreneurs.
The resulting bunching of innova-
tions (not to be confused with 
mere inventions, which Schumpeter
saw as occurring more or less 
continuously over time) boosts
investment spending, which bids
prices above costs and raises profit
margins thereby triggering the
upswing or prosperity  phase of the cycle. The high profit 
margins then attract swarms of imitators and would-be 
competitors into the innovating industries. Output over-
expands relative to the demand for it, prices fall to or below
costs thus eliminating profit margins, and the downswing or
recession phase begins. The recession continues, weeding out
inefficient firms as it goes, until the economy absorbs the
innovations and consolidates the attendant gains thus clearing
the ground for a fresh burst of innovation. 
If the upswing has been accompanied with speculative
excesses nonessential to innovation, the downswing may
overshoot the new post-innovation equilibrium. Then the
cycle enters its depression  phase where the excesses are
expunged and the economy returns via a recovery phase 
to equilibrium. Schumpeter stressed that the latter two
phases and the phenomena that generate them are 
unnecessary for cyclical growth and could be prevented 
by properly designed policy.  It’s not speculative bubbles but
rather the discontinuous clustering of innovations in time
plus their diffusion across and assimilation into the econo-
my that produces real cycles of prosperity and recession.
Profits, entrepreneurs, bank credit, innovation — all are
essential to the growth of per-capita real income in
Schumpeter’s model. Remove any one and the growth
process stops. Innovation, for instance, is abortive in the
absence of bank credit creation necessary to effectuate it.
Cash-strapped entrepreneurs cannot build their better
mouse traps from thin air. They require real resource inputs
and loans of newly created bank money to hire them away
from alternative employments. In highlighting this 
observation, Schumpeter effectively abandoned the classical
dichotomy notion that loan-created money is a mere
sideshow, a neutral veil that together with metallic money
determines the nominal, or absolute, price level while 
leaving real economic variables unaffected. Not so, said
Schumpeter. For him, money and credit are integral to the
process of real economic growth and so have real effects. 
Schumpeter’s most popular
hit was his 1942 book Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy. In it 
he coins the term “creative
destruction” to denote capital-
ism’s incessant killing off of the
old by the new. The book con-
tains his famous end-of-history
prediction that capitalism’s
very successes, not its failures
and contradictions as prophe-
sied by Karl Marx, will produce
social forces — the routiniza-
tion and depersonalization of
innovation, the destruction of
the image of the entrepreneur
as romantic hero, the creation
of a class of intellectuals hostile
to capitalism — which under-
mine the system and lead to its demise.
If capitalism cannot survive, can one rely upon its succes-
sor, socialism, to deliver the goods and amenities of life
efficiently and fairly? Yes, said Schumpeter, who proceeded
to provide the supporting argument. Many readers took him
at his word, but not McCraw. He sees Schumpeter’s
“defense” of socialism as a devastating satire that mocks the
system instead of bolstering it. Schumpeter, in other words,
comes not to praise socialism, but to bury it. In the end,
Schumpeter’s case for socialism rests on extremely abstract
theoretical conditions unlikely to be realized in practice. 
All of which creates a problem: If Schumpeter sought to show
that socialism was a practical impossibility, then why did he
predict its ultimate triumph over capitalism? One wishes that
the real Schumpeter would please stand up. 
As for democracy, Schumpeter viewed it as a political 
market in which politicians compete for the votes of the 
electorate just as producers compete for consumers’ dollars in
markets for goods and services. Always skeptical of 
consumer rationality, he believed that market power resides
more with vote seekers than with the electorate, 
whose apathy, ignorance, and lack of foresight enable 
politicians to set the policy agenda and to manipulate 
voter preferences. Even so, he felt that capitalism, as long as it
operates within a proper legal framework, is largely 
self-regulating and so requires little intervention. It thus 
constrains politicians’ market power more than does social-
ism. McCraw fails to note that these ideas mark Schumpeter
as a forerunner of the modern public choice school.
The last hit in the Schumpeter canon is his History of
Fall 2007 • Region Focus 41
Schumpeter preached creative
destruction — the incessant
tearing down of old ways 
of doing things by the new —
as capitalism’s inescapable
iron law, yet he was 
unprepared when his own
work fell prey to it.Economic Analysis, whose title expresses his contention that
the rise of analytic techniques in economics is part of the 
economic growth process and must be studied as such. 
The History, in terms of its scholarship, breadth of coverage,
richness of content, originality of interpretation, and 
wealth of resurrected valuable ideas, ranks with Jacob Viner’s
1937 book Studies in the Theory of International Trade as the
finest history of thought ever written. Scholars still mine it
for ideas today. Among other things, it provides sparkling
accounts of the quantity theory, the gold standard, Say’s Law,
the development of production and utility functions, 
and much more. 
Greatest Misses
Apart from an unfinished book on money, Schumpeter’s
misses include his massive, two-volume Business Cycles (1939),
which he wrote entirely by himself with no research assis-
tance. Seven years in the making, it emerged stillborn from
the press. McCraw, however, values the book for its histori-
cal narrative of the vicissitudes of firms in five industries and
three countries. But Schumpeter’s contemporaries saw only
the book’s prolixity, discursiveness, and lack of focus. Most
of all, they rejected its contrived, mechanistic analytical
schema composed of three superimposed cycles — the 
50-year Kondratieffs, 9-year Juglars, and 4-year Kitchens, all
named for their discoverers — into which Schumpeter
forced his data. As if these flaws weren’t enough to sink
Business Cycles, it had the bad luck, and bad timing, to appear
when J. M. Keynes’ celebrated General Theory was sweeping
the field. Everybody talked about Keynes’ book, few 
about Schumpeter’s.
Schumpeter and Keynes
Schumpeter fumed when Keynes and Keynesian economics
upstaged him in the 1930s and 1940s. Economists preferred
Keynes’ theory to Schumpeter’s because it seemed to 
offer a better explanation of and remedy for the Great
Depression, and because it possessed greater policy 
relevance and was more amenable to the mathematical 
modeling, econometric testing, and national income
accounting techniques just beginning to come into vogue 
in the ’30s.
Schumpeter should have foreseen this state of affairs. 
It was consistent with his doctrine of creative destruction in
which new theories, like new goods and new technologies,
displace the old in a never-ending sequence. Here Keynes
was the innovator whose analysis of capitalism rested 
on such novel concepts as the multiplier, marginal propensity
to consume, marginal efficiency of capital, and liquidity
preference function. Taken together, these Keynesian 
innovations were bound, according to the creative 
destruction doctrine, to have supplanted Schumpeter’s 
old-fashioned theory.
Instead of accepting this outcome, Schumpeter reacted
exactly as he had described entrenched interests doing 
when threatened by an innovation that disrupts their 
accustomed status quo: He put up stubborn resistance. 
His resistance, however, was motivated not so much by 
simple self-interest, or desire to protect his own theory, as 
by his scientific judgment that Keynesian economics was
fundamentally unsound. 
Schumpeter accused Keynes of assessing capitalism on
the basis of a short-run, depression-oriented model when
only a long-run growth-oriented one would do. He scorned
Keynes’ claim that capitalistic economies tend to be 
perpetually underemployed and in need of massive govern-
ment deficit spending to shore them up. He attacked the
“secular stagnation” notion that capitalists face vanishing
investment opportunities and slowing rates of technological
progress when the opposite is true. He rejected the 
contention that income must be redistributed from the rich
(who save too much) to the poor (who cannot afford to save)
in order to boost consumption spending and aggregate
demand. Nonsense, said Schumpeter. The insatiability of
human wants ensures that income, regardless of who
receives it, will be spent in one way or another. 
McCraw does a fine job discussing Schumpeter’s 
criticisms, all of which were valid, penetrating, and correct.
He fails, however, to note that Schumpeter essentially
attacked the wrong target. For it was not so much Keynes as
his British and American disciples — people like Joan
Robinson, R. F. Kahn, Abba Lerner, Schumpeter’s Harvard
colleague Alvin Hansen, and others — who were largely
responsible for the doctrines, especially their extreme 
versions, that Schumpeter countered. But McCraw rightly
points out that Schumpeter slipped when he opined that the
Keynesian-style permanently mixed economy, or public 
sector-private sector partnership, was unsustainable and
could not last. The private sector, Schumpeter reasoned,
would become addicted to government expenditure 
stimulus and demand ever-increasing amounts. In this way,
the public sector would expand relative to the private one
and the economy would gravitate to socialism. Time has
proved Schumpeter wrong. Private and public sectors have
coexisted in a fairly stable ratio in most developed countries
for the past 60 years. 
Controversial Issues
Schumpeter held politically unpopular opinions in the 1930s
when New Deal activism and populist anti-business 
sentiments were on the rise. He opposed President
Roosevelt’s New Deal reforms on the grounds that they
hampered entrepreneurship and growth. For the same 
reason, he opposed Keynesian macro demand-management
policies designed to tame the trade cycle. In his view,
because growth is inherently cyclical, one flattens the cycle
at the cost of eliminating growth. Other controversial 
opinions, all corollaries of his work on innovation and 
creative destruction, flowed from his pen.
Of income inequality he wrote that the gap between  rich
and poor is a prerequisite to and a relatively harmless 
byproduct of growth in a capitalistic system. The rich are
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invest in the innovation-embodied capital formation that
lifts the living standards of all. Moreover, high incomes 
provide both incentive and reward for the entrepreneurs
who propel growth. No one need fear that an unequal 
distribution will condemn them to poverty. The Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto’s notion of the “circulation of 
the elites” assures that. The ceaseless rise and fall 
of entrepreneurs into and out of the top income bracket 
means that it will be occupied over time by different 
people, many of them drawn from the ranks of the poor. 
The poor replace the rich and the rich the poor in 
never-ending sequence.
In assuming a high degree of mobility across income
groups, Schumpeter may have overlooked an education 
barrier. He failed to acknowledge that a superior education,
increasingly a prerequisite to entrepreneurship and wealth
in today’s high-tech world, is more affordable by the rich,
enabling them and their offspring to stay on top.
Monopolistic firms and monopolistic profits hardly 
worried Schumpeter. He thought that monopolies, unless
protected by government, are short-lived, inherently self-
destroying, and require no antitrust legislation. Their high
profits attract the very rivals and producers of substitute
products that undercut them. For the same reason, he
regarded antitrust laws aimed at breaking up large, 
nonmonopolistic firms as ill-advised. Not only are big 
firms often more efficient than small ones, but their
research and development departments house teams of spe-
cialists functioning collectively — and routinely — as an
entrepreneur who creates innovations that drive growth.
Indeed, the very existence of R&D departments indicates
that big firms realize they must continually innovate to 
stay alive.
Schumpeter’s politically unpopular opinions continued
into the wartime years of the 1940s. He distrusted
Roosevelt, suspecting him of trying to establish a 
dictatorship. And he had mixed emotions about the Axis
nations, Germany and Japan. He despised their military
establishments, leaders, and advisors. But he admired the
people and cultures of the two countries and feared that the
United States would impose punitive reprisals at war’s end.
Most of all, he saw the United States’ wartime ally, the 
Soviet Union, as its chief long-term foe, and thought 
that it would need Germany and Japan to serve as 
buffers against the communist nation. These views found 
little sympathy among Schumpeter’s friends and associates
in the ultrapatriotic environment of the early 1940s, a 
circumstance that caused him much unhappiness.
Schumpeter Today
The new improves upon and kills off the old. True enough.
But what’s new and what’s old may lie in the eye of the 
beholder. Today’s cutting-edge theorist and mathematical
modeler may regard Schumpeter’s analysis as older than old, a 
pre-Keynesian, pre-monetarist, pre-new classical/rational
expectations relic. Accordingly, Schumpeter’s name is stricken
from required reading lists in many top graduate economic 
programs where theory is king. To businessmen, journalists,
and historians seeking not abstract theory but rather practical
understanding of global capitalism, however, his work is as
fresh and insightful as the day he penned it. Journalists speak of
a renaissance of Schumpeterian economics and of a reversal 
of his relative ranking with Keynes. Although McCraw does
not say so, Schumpeter undoubtedly would be pleased, but
hardly surprised, by the revival of his work. It fits his 
description of the zigzag path of doctrinal history in which
sound economic ideas get lost or forgotten only to be 
rediscovered and restored to their proper place. 
AComplaint
A great book deserves a great index, or at the very least 
an adequate one. McCraw’s book has neither. Lacking 
comprehensiveness and precision, the index creates problems
for readers searching for particular items in the text. It is 
inexcusable that the index fails to cover the 188 pages of 
endnotes containing valuable scholarly information and 
constituting a fourth of the book. One can fault the publisher,
not the author, for this oversight. Luckily, it does little to mar
McCraw’s outstanding text. Elizabeth Schumpeter wrote 
that her husband “loved to read biographies.” It’s a sure bet
that he would have enjoyed this one. RF
Thomas M. Humphrey, a retired senior economist at 
the Richmond Fed and long-time editor of its 
Economic Quarterly, has written extensively about the 
history of economic thought. He can be reached at: 
moneyxvelocity@comcast.net
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component-level examinations as well as simulations with
dummies and sometimes cadavers (the latter led by universi-
ties). “It’s a lot more complex when we’re doing the testing,”
Jarvis says. “We have to design for 1,001 different scenarios
and we have to design so that occupants have the best level 
of protection in every one of those scenarios.” With regards
to the possible injuries to the pelvis of Ford Explorer passen-
gers, Jarvis says that even with multiple crash tests in
consistent settings, there will be variation. Also, injuries 
suffered by dummies don’t always translate to injuries suffered
by real people.
That said, Jarvis says Ford sees value in IIHS testing, as
well as that conducted by governments around the world.
“All of the public domain testing has upped the ante and
increased the debate in the level of design and safety testing,”
he says. “We certainly learn things from them.” RF
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